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STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING AGREEMENTS AS A
VEHICLE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
INTRODUCTION

After nearly two hundred years of operation, stock exchanges
remain largely unexplored as vehicles for regulating the internal
affairs of corporations whose stocks they list for trading. Such
regulation would seek to establish uniform, easily comprehensible
standards of corporate conduct and to communicate them to every
investor. The standards would be implemented by requiring that
corporations conform to them as a prerequisite to having their
securities traded on an exchange. As a result, investors could more
accurately assess the value of corporate equity securities than they
can today, and would be less likely to base an investment decision
on a misunderstanding of their potential rights as shareholders. 1
In evaluating the price of an equity security today, investors
face fifty state corporation laws and as many state judicial systems,
which together determine the bundle of rights the investor purchases. This problem stems from the principle that state law
defines the rights and obligations a corporation owes to its shareholders. 2 Investors who have neither the expertise to school themselves in the nuances of state corporation law nor the resources
to hire an attorney for that purpose 3 may choose "safer" investments, 4 or equally risky but more understandable investments, 5 or
I Stock exchanges currently regulate some aspects of internal corporate affairs,
see, e.g., note 40 infra, but this Comment advocates greater supervisory powers.
Furthermore, because of the relative obscurity of listing agreement provisions,
investors do not generally appreciate the specifies of current exchange regulations.
2 "'Corporations are creatures of state law,' and it is state law which is the
font of corporate directors' powers." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)). See also RE A-TENMENT (SEcoND)
or CoNFmcT or LAws §§ 301-13 (1971) (distinguishing laws applicable to internal
corporate affairs from those applicable to external affairs).
3 For example, the NYSE reported that over 80%of stock sales in 1979 were in
blocks of less than 900 shares, and that 31.6% involved less than 100 shares. The
comparable figures for 1978 were 83% and 32.9%. UNiED STATES DP'T or COMmRcE, 1980 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE Uriun STATES 545. In 1975, 17
million Americans with incomes of $25,000 or less owned stock, as opposed to 7
million with incomes over $25,000. Id. 547.
4 Domestic commercial banks held 666.6 billion dollars in time deposits in April
1980, id. 534, and savings and loan associations held 470.2 billion dollars in savings
in 1979, id. 536. These investments yield a relatively low rate of return, and some
substantially punish investors who reclaim their deposits before maturity.
GFor example, uninsured money markets have experienced astonishing growth
during recent years. See, e.g., Delaware Cash Reserve Quarterly Report 1 (June
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may select corporate securities in some uninformed way.6 The first
two choices divert money from industry and capital formation, and
the third means that investors do not adequately understand the
various economic and legal rights they receive by investing in the
corporation.7 If investors then suffer losses because they inadequately appraised their rights, they must rely for redress on ad
hoc rules, such as the directors' fiduciary obligation to the corporation, promulgated by the judiciary. Investors cannot currently
rely on "the market," in this case the exchange, to protect them by
setting standards of corporate behavior and disciplining wrongdoers.
An efficient market-based system of determining, and then protecting, shareholder rights depends on participants in the marketplace forming an accurate set of expectations. The accuracy of
these expectations, and the degree to which investors can prudently
rely on them, depends in part on the amount of information available." Encouraging investors to seek additional information by
making it more readily and cheaply available increases the likelihood of sound investment decisions. This, in turn, increases the
probability that investors will return for "another try" at the
market. Thus, corporate growth, capital formation, and industrial
expansion would be likely to result from replacing investors' present after-the-fact legal protection with before-the-fact market protection.
Stock exchanges can provide the information to make investment decisionmaking more informed. But exchanges are not
limited to spreading information. They can also substantially
decrease the amount or variety of information necessary for investment decisions by standardizing the legal rules governing investment
contracts. 9 Due to their expansive grant of authority, exchanges 10
25, 1981) ("[Alssets . . . today exceed $1.4 billion ....
[T~his figure is almost
three times larger than just one year ago when our assets stood at only $539.

million").
6See, e.g.,

B. MA xina. A RANDom WALx DowN WALL STREET (college rev.
ed. 1975).
7See, e.g., id.
8
The accuracy of information available also depends upon the costs of supervising the marketplace.
9 Recently, large brokerage houses began using legal analysts to calculate thelikely success or failure of suits against corporations. These economies of scale are,
obviously, not available to the average investor. See note 3 supra. Standardizing
legal rules applicable to corporations would make the outcome of an average investor's suit more predictable and would simultaneously reduce the need for brokers'
"legal10 work."
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976),
provides that "[a]n exchange shall not be registered as a national securities exchange
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could approach "corporate governance" issues quite flexibly. By
developing, interpreting, and applying new rules, exchanges would
contribute significantly to the predictability of corporation law by
ending the investors' nightmare of fifty separate legal systems."
The stock exchanges' major vehicle for regulating corporate
conduct is its listing agreement with the corporation?12 By requiring the listed corporation to follow various provisions and
reservations in the agreement, stock exchanges can effectively
govern aspects of the corporation's internal affairs. Corporate
governance by listing agreement is not a novel idea and, to a limited
extent, has been in effect for nearly a century.' 3 But the full extent
to which these agreements can be used to protect investors has yet
to be realized.
Past underutilization of the exchanges' listing agreement powers
may stem in part from the legal uncertainties surrounding a fullscale movement into corporate governance. Even present listing
unless the Commission determines that-... [its] rules ... are designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable prin,ciples of trade . . . and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest."
" Stock exchanges should be less reluctant than states to stiffen corporate
regulations. For states must always contend with the possibility that too much
regulation will lead the corporation to move its headquarters, harming that states
tax base and employment prospects. Furthermore, states are generally jealous of
their right to make their laws independently.
Furthermore, even if the market-based regulatory system failed, requiring an
investor to consider seeking judicial intervention, the increased certainty of corporate law that would result from "listing agreement regulation" would assist the
investor in making a correct decision whether to sue. Vexatious suits would not be
avoided, but those based upon misunderstandings of, or uncertainties about, the
law likely would be.
12 Listing agreements are simply a number of requirements, in the nature of
restrictive covenants, that a corporation must agree to if it wishes its shares to be
publicly traded on a national securities exchange. For example, the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that listed corporations have at least 2000 shareholders holding 100 or more shares. 2 NYSE GumE (CCH) f 2495B (1976).
13 See R. SoB-_, TE BiG BoAnn 114 (1965). The most recent use of listing
agreements to effect corporate regulation occurred in 1977, when the NYSE adopted
a requirement that all listed corporations establish an "audit committee" of inde-pendent outside directors. See. Act Rel. No. 34-13245 (Feb. 4, 1977), reprinted in
2 NYSE GUmE (CCH) 112495H (1980).
Audit committees examine financial statements produced by the corporation's

,outside auditors to insure that they accurately reflect the corporation's activities.
For a description of the work of such committees, see ABA Committee on Corporate
Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAw. 1335
(1980). There is a growing consensus that audit committees can be a significant
addition to the functions of the board of directors. See Statement of the Business
Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2108 (1978). See also SEC v.
Killearn Properties, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RPP. (CCH)
1196,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977) (consent decree requiring establishment of an audit
-committee); 533 Sac. REC. & L. BRP. (BNA) A-10 (Dec. 19, 1979) (AMEX Board
-of Governors recommends audit committees for listed firms).
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agreements, with their limited intrusions into corporate boardrooms, are subject to potential legal attack. More stringent listing
requirements, by more frequently "coercing" corporate activities,
will further emphasize that these regulations emanate from private
bodies rather than from traditional, governmental sources.' 4 Three
arguments would likely be raised against governance of corporate
conduct by court enforcement of listing agreements. 15
First, it might be argued that enforcement of certain listing
agreement provisions would constrain the internal operations of
listed corporations, thereby exceeding the authority delegated to
the exchanges by the federal securities laws. Second, it could be
contended that enforcement of listing agreement provisions intrudes on a substantive area of law reserved to the states, therefore
violating principles of federalism. Third, it may be suggested that
certain listing agreement provisions violate the antitrust laws by
restraining trade.
This Comment concludes that only the first of these legal
problems poses a serious threat to listing agreement enforcement.
Part I discusses necessary background information, tracing the history of listing agreements. Part II discusses the framework within
which a challenge to listing agreements' legality is likely to occur,
resolving difficult questions about who will be able to enforce listing
agreements and who may challenge an exchange's failure to do so.
Part III addresses the merits of the legal arguments against listing
agreements' validity. Finally, part IV presents a proposal that
avoids the potential difficulty posed by the argument that enforcing
listing agreements exceeds stock exchanges' legal authority.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The Rise of Listing Requirements
The origins of listing agreements lie in the growth of national
stock exchanges and, in particular, the New York Stock Exchange
14This problem of private versus governmental regulation is the critical policy

issue presented by the suggestion that listing agreements be used to effect corporate
governance. The private, market-based approach advocated by this Comment
makes governance largely a matter of quasi-contractual agreement. But it removes
control over a large number of investors' financial resources from the political
process, and makes it less likely that those investors can affect the rules that govern
the companies they invest in.
35 Delisting, which removes the violator's securities from the exchange and prevents exchange members from trading the violator's stock, is the most severe sanction
available to exchanges in enforcing the listing agreements. See generally 2 NYSE
GuID (CCH) 12499 (1978).
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(NYSE).' From the earliest development of exchanges, the NYSE
was dominant, its members trading the highly desirable securities
issued by the soundest companies. 17 In the 19th century, the NYSE
consolidated its virtual monopoly, placing restrictions on the securities it permitted its members to trade.' s These restrictions
included provisions about the acceptable size and profitability of
companies whose securities could be traded, minimum shareholder
requirements to insure broad ownership, and rudimentary disclosure of the companies' financial position.' 9 Thus, from earliest
times, stock exchanges have determined certain aspects of corporate
conduct. 20
With the enactment of the securities laws of 1933 21 and 1934,22
federal law took on part of the burden of regulating corporate
conduct. These laws required 23 exchanges to promulgate and
enforce 24 various restrictions on their members, on listed cor16See generally R. SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD 81-144 (1965). Other exchanges
originated with the NYSE, such as the Curb Exchange, a smaller competitor in
New York which eventually became the American Stock Exchange. Regional exchanges also grew up, achieving varying degrees of success. See generally J.
WALTEp, TiE RoLE OF REGIONAL SECUIY EXCHANGES (1957).
17 See R. SOBFL, supra note 16, at 83-87.
18 See id. 85.
'9 NYSE Company Manual A-32.
See 2 NYSE GumE (CCH) ITI2495B-95C
(1980).
20
For a useful history of early stock exchange disclosure requirements, see
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Exchange Market: An Evaluation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. EcoN. REv. 132 (1973).
21 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§ 1-328, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. I1 1979) ).
22
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §§ 1-211, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)).
23 Section 5 of the 1934 Act demonstrates that exchanges must comply with
its provisions by rendering transactions in securities on an exchange unlawful unless
that exchange is registered or has been explicitly exempted from registration. 15
U.S.C. §78e (1976).
24
See, e.g., 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ff 1653 (1978) (expulsion and suspension
from membership---disciplinary proceedings); 2 Am. STocK Ex. GUIDE (CCH)
ff 9040 (1978) (discipline of members-procedure); id. ff 9042 (1980) (suspension
in view of financial or operating conditions); id. ff 9043 (1980) (suspension or expulsion); NASD GuImE (CCH) IT2205 (1975) (suspension for failure to furnish
information). See also 1934 Act, §6(b)1, 6, 15 U.S.C. §78f(b)(1), (6) (1976)
(specifying that the SEC shall not register an exchange unless the exchange demonstrates the ability to enforce its rules). For a critique of the insufficiency of restraints currently placed on such powers to discipline exchange members, see
Lowenfels, The Lack of Fair Procedures in the Administrative Process: Disciplinary
Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and the NASD, 64 ConsRLL L. REv. 375
(1979).
25For example, NYSE Rule 390 generally forbids stock exchange members
and their agents from trading listed securities in over-the-counter markets. 2 NYSE
GuE (CCH) IT2390 (1978). Yet nothing in sections 5 or 6 of the 1934 Act
requires this prohibition.
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porations, 26 and on themselves. 27 Moreover, these Acts established
the principle of self-regulation in the securities industry, making
stock exchanges and similar organizations responsible for surveil2
lance over the transactions taking place in their facilities.
By 1975,2 9 Congress was apparently persuaded that this selfregulatory system needed an overhaul. 30 By passing the Securities
Acts-Amendments of 1975,31 Congress reallocated regulatory responsibilities among the stock exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), greatly enhancing the
Commission's power.3 2 Even so, the exchanges retain significant
ability to control corporate conduct through listing agreements.
26 For instance, section 13(a) of the 1934 Act requires those companies whose
securities are traded on the exchange to publish periodic disclosures of operations.
15 U.S.C. §78m(a) (1976). Form 10K specifies the required information, 17
C.F.R. § 249.310 (1980), and the SEC recently took steps to consolidate reporting
requirements so that form 10K filings do not duplicate annual reports to shareholders
and new issue registration.
Corporations must also meet a number of technical prerequisites to listing.
See, e.g., 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2495B (1980) (minimum size, profitability, and
shareholder distribution requirements).
27Section 17 of the 1934 Act established an elaborate record-keeping machinery for the operation of the exchanges and their members. 15 U.S.C. § 78q
(1976). See 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-1 (1980) (exchange recordkeeping rule).
28Stock exchanges are the most familiar self-regulating organizations. Others
include the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the various industry groups overseeing operation of
the security markets.
Self-regulation is generally justified by the complexity of the transactions involved and the need for regulators to be intimately familiar with the regulated
markets. See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1975) reprinted in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 175, 223-24. For an excellent description of the
role of self-regulation in the scheme of securities law, see Address by M. Cohen,
Competition, Regulation and Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry (U. Pa.
Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Nov. 18, 1974).
29The most important pre-1975 amendments were in 1938 and 1964. The
1938 legislation added section 15A, prescribing rules for registration of national
securities dealers' associations. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §780-3 (1976)). The 1964 change standardized disclosure
requirements in over-the-counter and exchange markets. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 7, 78 Stat. 574 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-3
(1976) ).
30
SuBcom,. ON SEcURImEs or rH SENATE Co.ms. ON BANCKING, HousING,
A N URBAN AFFAIRS, SEcunITEs INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY STUDY]; Szcunrnzs AcTs Am mE.sNTs
oF 1975, SENATE CozN. ON BA imrs, Housmo AND URBAN A.FaS, S. REP. No.
75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 179 [hereinafter cited as

SENATE REPoRT].

3' Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 2, 89 Stat. 97
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §78b (1976)).
32 SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-31, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
Co Nc. & AD. Nzws at 207-09.
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To be listed on the stock exchange,33 a corporation must
34
effectively comply with two sets of federal securities regulations.
First, the corporation must be registered under section 12(b) of the
1934 Act.3 5 Second, the corporate issuer must respond to the exchanges' listing application.3 Because section 12 does not mention
registration with the stock exchange, or any other provision of the
exchange listing agreements, there is no legal requirement that an
exchange maintain a different listing procedure from that required
by section 12. In practice, however, some aspects of listing agree37
ments generally go beyond section 12 requirements.
Two types of listing agreement provisions are apparent.3 3
First, there are provisions governing size, profitability, and shareholder distribution.3 9 These provisions differ little from section 12
33
Congress also demonstrated particular concern over anticompetitive actions
by self-regulatory organizations. See bmusmRY STonY, supra note 30, at 77-79.
Thus, it moved strongly to increase competition. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (a)
(1976). See notes 138-66 infra & accompanying text.
3
4Throughout this Comment's analysis, it is important to understand the distinction between exchange rules regarding members and their access to the exchange,
and exchange listing agreements with corporate issuers. Members are defined
in part as "(i) any natural person permitted to effect transactions on the floor of
the exchange without the services of another person acting as broker, . . . [and] to
the extent of the rules of the exchange specified by the Commission, any person
required by the Commission to comply with such rules." 1934 Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C.
§78c(a)(3)(A) (1976).
This comment, in using the word "rules," is not referring to the rules that
apply to members of the stock exchange as defined above in section 78c unless
explicitly stated. Reference to "rules" will be to those rules applying to corporations
listed on a national exchange.
3 The corporation must file an application with both the exchange and the
SEC setting forth specified information as required by § 12(b) (1) of the 1934
Act, the regulations thereunder, and SEC Form 10. § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781
(1976); rule 12b, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-1 to .12b-36 (1980).
36 The exchanges' listing application may request different information from that
required by section 12. For a side-by-side comparison of the two sets of required
disclosures, see 2 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 23,095-120 (1981). For an example
of the mechanics of the exchange's processing of the application for listing, see
NYSE Company Manual B-4 (1978) (preliminary confidential review); 1934 Act,
§ 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1976) (listing effective within thirty days of exchange
certification of approval to the SEC).
37
Generally the NYSE has the most restrictive provisions. Furthermore, because most stock trading in regional exchanges is in so-called multiply-listed stocks,
the provisions of these exchange listing agreements are not as rigorous. The variation in question, therefore, is largely the increasing stringency from the regional
exchanges to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) to the NYSE.
38 There are, of course, numerous miscellaneous provisions.
See, e.g., NYSE
Company Manual A-5 (1977) (specifies location and nature of the transfer agent
for the securities); id. A-151 to -164 (specifies the procedure for announcing record
dates for voting of shares and receipt of dividends), and other provisions that require
procedures for announcing and carrying out stock dividends and splits, rights
offerings and procedures for soliciting proxies.
39 To be listed on the NYSE, the corporation must have at least one million
publicly traded shares with a market value of between $8 and $16 million and at
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requirements. Second, there are provisions that affect corporate
conduct in areas such as voting power, matters required to be voted
upon by shareholders, classes of directors, and disclosure requirements. 40 These latter provisions, reaching "corporate governance"
issues, raise the major questions of legality.
B. Listing Agreement Enforcement
The most obvious and commonly employed method of enforcing listing agreements is for the exchange to "delist" violators.
The exchange's power to delist comes from its duty, imposed by
the securities laws, to enforce its registration requirements. 41 If,
however, an exchange failed to act against an alleged violator,
private parties may seek judicial assistance in enforcing the listing agreements. Such a private action might be asserted against
the exchange, the listed corporation, or both, and would probably
seek damages or an injunction requiring the exchange to delist.
Damages could be claimed from either the exchange's failure to
delist or the corporation's breach of the listing agreement.
Private suits, unlike exchange delisting powers, are not provided for by securities law. Private parties might seek to maintain
an action on the theory that they are third-party beneficiaries of
least 2,000 shareholders holding 100 or more shares. In addition, the corporation
must have demonstrated earning power by producing a pre-tax profit of $2.5 million
in the year prior to listing and at least $2 million in each of the two preceding
years. This is a bit oversimplified; for a more precise delineation of the numerical
requirements, see NYSE Company Manual B-3, -3.1 (1979).
The AMEX and the regional exchanges impose less stringent standards for
size and profitability. The AMEX requires a listed corporation to have 800 shareholders of more than 100 shares each and a minimum market value of publicly
held shares of $3 million. 2 FaD. SEc. L. Rp. (CCH) 123,025.081 (1980). The
Midwest Stock Exchange requires a listed corporation to have 250,000 shares of
common stock, with 1,000 holders of at least 100 shares if the value of the stock
is'less than $15 a share, 1,500 holders if the stock value is $15-50 a share, 2,500
holders if the stock value is $50-100 a share, and 3,000 holders if the value is over
$100 a share. MiDwEsT STOcK EXCHANcG GUIDE (CCH) 11506 (1967).
The NYSE also maintains a separate and somewhat less stringent set of
standards for the maintenance of listed status. NYSE Company Manual B-58
to -78. The AMEX requires previous year pre-tax income of $750,000. 2 Fa'.
SEc. L. Rp. (CCH) f23,025.081 (1980).
40 NYSE Company Manual A-280 (1977)
(non-voting common stock prohibited); id. A-281 (preferred stock with disproportionate voting rights disfavored);
id.A-280 (classes of directors limited to three); id. A-283 to -284 (required shareholder vote on option plans for officers and directors; changes in corporate control;
significant dealings with insiders, and issuance of securities resulting in a 20%
change in ownership or voting power); id. B-23 (two outside directors on each
board suggested); id.A-29 (audit committee of outside directors required); id.
A-30 to -31 (defensive "tactics" scrutinized closely); id. A-18, A-22 (time disclosure of material corporate news).
41 See note 24 supra.
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the listing agreement between exchange and corporation. Alternatively, private plaintiffs might argue that their cause of action
should be judicially implied. Should both of these approaches
prove unavailing, the listing agreement's importance as a vehicle
for corporate regulation would be diminished, for actions to enforce its provisions would be initiated only at the exchange's discretion.
The choice between the third-party beneficiary theory and the
judicial implication theory of private actions depends upon resolution of the question whether listing agreements are to be treated
as private contracts or legal rules. If listing agreements are private
contracts between the exchange and the listed corporation, then
plaintiffs must establish that they are third party beneficiaries of
that agreement in order to prevail in a lawsuit. If, however, the
agreements are legal rules promulgated by the exchange pursuant
to delegated regulatory authority, then plaintiffs may be able to
prevail by establishing the existence of an implied private right of
action under section 6 or section 10 of the Securities Act of 1934.
Because of this distinction's significance for maintaining private
actions to enforce listing agreements, this Comment now considers
whether the agreements should be treated as private contracts or
legal rules.
C. Contractor Rule?
The argument that listing agreements are contracts is premised
largely upon the parties' voluntary decision to enter into them and
accept their terms. Corporations accept listing agreement provisions,
as a matter of choice, in order to secure a place on the exchange. But
no company is compelled to trade its shares on the exchange, and
those deciding to trade only in over-the-counter markets are not
obliged to follow listing agreement requirements. In short, listing
agreements' contractual nature is arguably evidenced by the lack
of compulsion upon the parties and the availability of alternative
ways of doing business.
Yet, in a somewhat similar situation involving brokers and dealers, Congress made clear that it did not consider the voluntariness
argument sufficient to conclude that members had contracted away
their rights to procedural fairness. 42 Exchanges, even if agreement
42 The Senate Report makes this point as follows:

The Committee is well aware of the historical differences between "membership" in an exchange and in the NASD. The limited number of "seats"
on an exchange, as contrasted with the availability of NASD membership
to all qualified brokers and dealers, is only the most obvious of these
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provisions are to the contrary, must follow the same sorts of procedures by which nonexclusive organizations are bound.43
Congress, then, views broker and dealer agreements with exchanges as rules, at least when due process is concerned. Unfortu44
nately, it has not expressed a view of listing agreements' status.
Nevertheless, in addition to the broker and dealer analogy, the
securities statutes and public policy both support treating listing
agreements as rules.
Section 19(b) of the 1934 Securities Act requires that modification of listing agreement provisions follow the same notification
and approval procedures as rule changes involving broker or dealer
members. 45 By treating modification of listing agreements as
changes in broker and dealer agreements, Congress made clear that
it considers these two sorts of arrangements procedurally similar.
Consequently, Congress's explicit understanding that broker and
dealer agreements are rules makes it likely that listing agreements
are also rules.
The analogy is reinforced by considering the consequences of
each type of agreement. By changing investors' perceptions of the
risk involved in selecting a particular corporate security, listing
agreements can have as significant an effect on the capital formation
process as the broker-dealer trading "rules." 46 Indeed, stock exdifferences. However, the Committee does not believe that the substantive differences in the two concepts of membership justify any less
attention to procedural fairness in the case of the exchanges than in that
of the NASD.
SENATE REPowr, supra note 30, at 25, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CoDn CoNG. & An.
NEws at 203-04.
43 Id.
44 Case law is also particularly unrevealing. A number of cases seem to assume
that listing agreement provisions are rules. See, e.g., Lank v. NYSE, 548 F.2d 61
(2d Cir. 1977); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 947 (1975). The latter case went so far as to say in dictum that "[t]he
listing agreement and Company Manual are 'instruments corresponding' to rules
of the Exchange." Id. 1380.
4 1934 Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1976) requires exchanges and selfregulatory organizations (SROs) to notify the SEC of proposed rule changes. The
Senate Report analogizes rulemaking by SROs to rulemaking by governmental units
and sets up procedural analogies to the Administrative Procedure Act. SENATE
Rzi'orT, supra note 30, at 29, reprinted in [1975] U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEws
at 207-08. It is interesting to note that the NYSE listing agreement modification requiring audit committees was approved by the SEC under the 19(b) procedure,
adding force to the argument by analogy. See See. Ex. Act Bel. No. 34-13245
(Feb. 4, 1977).
46
SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 2, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Cone CONG.
& AD. Nxws at 180-81.
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changes, in promulgating regulations through listing agreements,
are instructed to remember "at all times that they [are] quasi-public
organizations, not private clubs ....,,4
Furthermore, exchanges can impose the severe penalty of delisting on corporations violating the agreements, 48 thus enforcing
standards that differ little from substantive federal rules governing
corporate conduct. So it can be argued that delisting, which resembles a punitive measure or civil action, effectively backs listing
agreements with the force of law.
Other aspects of listing ageements also support the argument
that they are in effect rules of law. Exchanges are partially regulated governmental instrumentalities with a mandate to "protect
investors," and the enforcement of listing agreement provisions is
not significantly different from an administrative agency enforcing
laws or regulations for that purpose. Listing agreements' uniform
application to all listed companies, and the potential retroactive
application of newly promulgated standards, 49 also indicate that
"rule" is an accurate characterization.
29, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODEB CoNG. & AD. NEws at 207.
The 1934 Act provides that "[securities] may be withdrawn or stricken from
listing and registration in accordance with the rules of the exchange and, upon
such terms as the Commission may deem necessary to impose for the protection of
investors, upon application by the issuer or the exchange to the Commission."
§ 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1976). SEC regulations give exchanges the power
to temporarily suspend trading in a security or to make application to have the
security delisted. In instances in which the security has matured, been redeemed,
or been replaced, the regulations require that the exchange commence delisting. 17
C.F.R. §240.12d2-2(a) (1980). In cases where the security has been shifted to
trading on another exchange, and an exchange rule exists which requires termination on such an occasion, the regulations give the exchange the power to strike the
security from its listing. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2(b) (1980). In addition, the regulations empower the exchanges to apply to the SEC for delisting in other cases in
accordance with exchange rules. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2(c) (1980). The regulations state that the SEC must approve the request unless it finds that a hearing
is necessary to determine whether the application to delist has been made in accordance with the exchange rules and whether specific additional terms are needed
for the protection of investors. Id.
Delisting imposes considerable costs on the corporation. In an as yet unpublished and unreleased SEC economic study, Professor Daniel S. Dhaliwal argues
that the cost of capital to over-the-counter companies is higher than it is for
similar listed companies. See 581 SEC. REG. & L. BrP. (BNA) A-8 (December 3,
1980). Additionally, only designated over-the-counter stocks can be purchased on
margin, limiting the market for those other securities. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976). The over-the-counter market is discussed in
S. RonBnNs, THE SEcunrrEs MbApars (1966).
49
Future changes in the stock exchange listing agreement are not directly retroactive as to previously listed securities; but'listing agreements generally require that
new securities cannot be listed unless all the securities of the issuer are subject to
the current listing agreement strictures. Hence, although not in a strictly literal
sense, for many intents and purposes the exchange listing agreements operate retroactively. See, e.g., NYSE Company Manual B-67.
47 Id.
48
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Enactment of SEC proposed rule 3b-7 5 0 would clarify listing
agreements' legal status. The proposal defines "rules" as "guidelines or standards that a self-regulatory organization employs in a
determination to grant or deny access to its facilities." 51 This
definition implies that denial of access to self-regulatory organizations is a serious business handicap, so that the power to control
access must be subject to strict control. Because listing agreements
are used to grant or deny a corporation access to exchange facilities,
their provisions are almost certainly within the proposal's definition
of rules.
Currently, however, the question is debatable. Because statutory interpretation and public policy favor the construction, this
Comment treats listing agreement provisions as legal rules extend52
ing federal regulatory power in the securities field.
II.

PRIvATE

ENFORCEMENT OF

LISTING

AGREEMENTS

A. Implied Right of Action
Assuming that listing agreements are construed as legal rules,
potential plaintiffs would assert that their right to enforce the provisions should be judicially implied. A private cause of action
against the exchange would be based on section 6 of the Securities
Act of 1934; suits against the corporate issuer would be based on
section 6 or section 10 of the Act.
1. Private Suits Against the Exchange
Because no court has recently addressed the question whether
a private cause of action against the exchange can be judicially
implied,5 3 it is useful to consider judicial treatment of the very
similar agreements between exchanges and broker-dealer members.5 4
The most recent case, Rich v. NYSE, "5 held that private causes of
50 Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 34-15838 (May 18, 1979), reprinted in [1979] FED'.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 7f82,082.

51 Id. 7f82,082, at 81,808.
Z2 See notes 53-87 infra & accompanying text. Because the rule-contract question is unsettled, this Comment also addresses private actions under the third-party
beneficiary theory. See notes 88-95 infra & accompanying text.
53 Only one case has explicitly addressed the private action question in the
context of stock exchange listing agreement violations, and that case was decided
prior to the Supreme Court's enunciation of stricter implication standards. Van
Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
54 See notes 139-66 infra & accompanying text.

55 509 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See, e.g., Murphy v. McDonnell & Co.,
553 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1977); Lank v. NYSE, 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977); Hughes
v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896
(1976).
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action against brokers and dealers asserted under section 6 had survived the Supreme Court's stiffening of implied right standards. 5
Because of the similarity between listing and broker-dealer agreements, plaintiffs can argue by analogy with Rich that a private right
should exist in listing agreement cases. 57
Besides the argument by analogy with broker-dealer agreements, plaintiffs can argue that the lack of other existing remedies
supports an implied private enforcement right against the exchange.
The Supreme Court, emphasizing that means of enforcing compliance with the statute existed without implication of a private
right, appears to have accepted the converse of this argument in
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis. 58

In this case,

unlike Transamerica,the statute provides no remedy.
In fact, only two sections of the 1934 Act expressly sanction
exchanges for rule violations. Section 19(a)(1)59 permits outright
revocation or suspension of an exchange's registration for up to
twelve months. Section 32 60 prescribes a fine for the exchange
of not more than $500,000. Neither section, however, helps the
defrauded investor whom the statute professes to protect,6' for
"[b]oth [sections] are punitive and remedial measures, rather than
compensatory; and while they may be of benefit to future investors,
they do nothing for those who have already been the victims ..... 62
56 The court noted that an implied action under this section had been recognized since the decision in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944). The court concluded that, because Congress had chosen not
to omit such an action during the extensive 1975 securities law revisions, see notes
29-32 supra & accompanying text, it intended that the right continue.
The court also concluded that the asserted action met the four-pronged implied
private action test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), see notes 74-76 infra &
accompanying text, and added further: "[W]here there is a long history of a vellsettled universally accepted implication of an unstated cause of action, I believe
...the Cort test is at least modified, and perhaps overridden, by consideration for
those long-standing traditions." 509 F. Supp. at 89.
5WAgain, however, it must be emphasized that plaintiffs must show more than
that they are simply aggrieved investors. As the Court stated in a similar situation,
"the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect [the plaintiff class] does not
require the implication of a private cause of action .... The dispositive question
remains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy." Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (citations omitted).
58 Id. 19 ("[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it").
59 15 U.S.C. §78s(h)(1) (1976).
60 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976).
,1Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1) (1976) (exchange registration may be revoked
or suspended "in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
62 Baird, 141 F.2d at 238.
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Given Congress's express intention to protect investors 63 and its
failure to provide a means of doing so, it can be argued that a private
cause of action against the exchange must have been intended.
2. Private Actions Against the Corporation
The argument for an implied private cause of action against
the listed corporation seems somewhat stronger than the case against
the exchange. Section 10 of the 1934 Act provides the most persuasive basis for such an argument because an implied cause of action
under that section has existed since 1946.4 The plaintiff would
contend that listed status on a stock exchange is a representation of
trustworthiness, financial capability, and other pertinent corporate
characteristics. Thus, violation of the listing agreement would be
a misrepresentation to investors within section 10(b)'s proscriptions.
But no court has carefully considered a private right under section 10 in the context of listing agreement violations. The Tenth
Circuit," without thoroughly examining the question, held that a
claim of listing agreement violations would not substitute for the
requirement of willful or intentional misconduct in a section 10(b)
case.6 6 Combined with the Supreme Court's clear intention to
curtail any further extension of implied 10 (b) actions,6 7 this holding makes it likely that an effort to extend implied private rights
to this area would meet judicial resistance.
Besides section 10, plaintiffs could also assert an implied private
right against the corporation under section 6 of the 1934 Act. This
action could be based on a number of equitable grounds. For
example, in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,6 the Second Circuit suggested that the corporation owed a duty of fairness to its share63 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1).

See note 61 supra.

64

Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
Supreme Court did not face this question until 25 years later when it affirmed the

long line of precedent upholding the implied section 10 action. Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
85 Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). Accord, State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
66 Utah State Univ., 549 F.2d at 169.
67
E.g., Santa, Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (section 10(b)
actions do not reach corporate mismanagement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter element of common law fraud required for implied
section 10 actions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(potential plaintiff class limited to actual buyers and sellers of securities).

68520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
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holders,

9

and that implicit guarantees of trustworthiness accom-

panied a corporation's listing on the exchange7 0 If that suggestion
is correct, then the present statutory scheme fails to compensate
for corporate misdeeds just as badly as it does when the injured
investors sue the exchange. 71
Suits against both the exchange and the listed corporation,
therefore, are based upon the premise that Congress passed the 1934
Act in order to protect investors. Investors must argue that, given
the absence of any express compensatory remedies, they must have
been intended to have a right to sue for violations of listing agreements, which are entered into largely to afford them the intended

protection.
3. Obstacles to An Implied Private Right
The difficulty with the argument for an implied private right
of action is that courts have disfavored them during the past decade.
This represents a marked change from cases decided between 1946

and 1960, notably involving sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934
Act, in which courts liberally granted plaintiffs private rights of
action although the statute did not provide for them.7 2 The flood
of federal securities litigation during the 1960s was probably responsible for diminishing judicial enthusiasm for implied private rights
in securities law, a trend culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash.73
Cort set forth a four-pronged test 74 for analyzing asserted private rights, and four years later the Court refined that test in
69 "The duty of a listed company to its own securities holders to treat them
fairly is founded in fundamental concepts of the law pertaining to corporate
fiduciaries." Id. 1382 n.19 (citations omitted).
70 [W]e find inviting [the argument] that[,] to the American investing
public[,] listing on the New York Stock Exchange carries with it implicit
guarantees of trustworthiness. The public generally understands that a
company must meet certain qualifications of financial stability, prestige,
and fair disclosure, in order to be accepted for that listing, which is in
turn so helpful to the sale of the company's securities. Similarly it is
held out to the investing public that by dealing in securities listed on the
New York Stock Exchange the investor will be dealt with fairly and
pursuant to law.
Id. 1381.
71
See text accompanying notes 53-63 supra.
72 J. L Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) and Mills v. Electric Auto-IAte Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970), both decided under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1976), may be considered the high points of the implied right of action.
See A. FAxE, J. CuoPER, N. LxwH & C. Moams, CAsEs &im MATEniL oN Con,oRA&ToNs 472-73 (1977).

73422 U.S. 66 (1975).
74 The four factors were (1) whether plaintiff is one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any explicit or implicit
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TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 75 and Touche Ross
& Co. v. Reddington.7 6 These cases made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to meet the Cort test by emphasizing the need to show
membership in the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted
and to demonstrate legislative intent to create a private right. The
latter requirement seems of critical importance, for the Court concluded in Transamerica that "what must ultimately be determined
is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
asserted." 77
To overcome the argument by analogy to broker-dealer
agreements, 78 a court will likely point to the Supreme Court's
recent focus on congressional intent in implication cases. The legislative history of sections 6 and 10 is silent about whether private
parties were intended to have the right to enforce their provisions.
Although the Supreme Court has said such slience "does not automatically undermine [the plaintiff's] position," 79 the Court has
called it "hardly helpful to the [plaintiff]," 80 and a lower court
would probably heed the Supreme Court's warning that "implying
a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a
hazardous enterprise, at best." 81
To counter the argument that the lack of a remedy to vindicate
the statute's purpose and the scarcity of express sanctions against
exchanges make a private right necessary, a court could point to
sections 9(e), 82 16(b), 8 and 18 (a),84 which explicitly grant private
rights of action under certain circumstances. These sections
demonstrate that "when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly," 8 and
legislative intent to create or deny a private right of action; (3) whether it is consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme to imply a private right of action,
and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.

See id. 78.

75 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
76 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
77444 U.S. at 15-16.
78
See notes 42-48 supra and notes 53-57 supra& accompanying text.
79 Transaaerica,444 U.S. at 18.
80 Id.
81 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571.
82

15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).

8315
84

U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).

15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).

85 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572.
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make it "highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot
to mention an intended private action.' "6
In sum, the judiciary's recent reluctance to imply private causes
of action is likely to result in rejection of the arguments for implication under section 6 in the listing agreement context. Moreover,
the Court's apparent intention to minimize extension of section 10 private rights will probably prove fatal to plaintiffs proceeding under that section.87 Yet such actions seem the only way
of insuring that investors will truly be protected, and that listing
agreement enforcement will not lie completely within the exchange's
discretion.
B. Third-PartyBeneficiary Theory
If, contrary to this Comment's analysis, listing agreement provisions were to be construed as contracts between the listed corporadon and the exchange, shareholders might seek to premise exchange
or corporate liability on a third-party beneficiary theory. To fall
within the class of "intended beneficiary" of a contract, a third party
must show that it will gain pecuniary benefit from the promised performance and that the contract makes clear to the promisor that the
benefit is a motivating cause of the contract for the promisee.88
Alternatively, an "intended beneficiary" may be found when a third
party is a creditor of the promisee and the contract calls for performance in satisfaction of the obligation.8 9
Courts generally have struggled with the practical problems of
forcing listing agreements into the mold of private contracts. The
strain is revealed, for example, when the plaintiff is a prospective
86 Transamerica,444 U.S. at 20 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
In Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944), the court answered this argument by noting that:
Those three sections deal with special matters only indirectly germane to
the regulation of securities exchanges; they provide for more unrestricted
recovery than would be possible at common law; and they prescribe narrow
statutes of limitation. Also, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a), directly
states that "the rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in

addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law
or in equity."

Id. 245.
8t

See Comment, Implication of Civil Liability Under the New York Stock Exchange Rules and Listing Agreement, 22 Vxu.. L. Rxv. 130 (1976).
884 A. Connme, CoNTRncrs § 776, at 18 (1951).

9Id. § 774.
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purchaser of corporate securities rather than a shareholder. Courts,
following traditional contract analysis, have dismissed these actions
on the formalistic ground of lack of privity.90
Two federal courts have addressed the question of third-party
beneficiary status for current security-holders.0l One permitted the
action against an exchange, not an issuer, reasoning that the relation between the SEC and the exchange provided the requisite intent to benefit.9 2 This decision seems to merge contract theory
with a private right of action, and may not survive the recent
stringency in implying such private rights.9 3
No case has gone so far as to confer third-party beneficiary
status on a shareholder suing a corporate issuer for breach of the
listing agreement. Judge Oakes, writing for the court in Van
Gemert v. Boeing Co., would have held that the plaintiff shareholders were creditors of the corporate issuer, and were therefore
entitled to third-party beneficiary status according to the second
test,94 but the majority did not reach the issue. 95
In short, plaintiffs seeking to enforce listing agreements on a
third-party beneficiary theory will, like those arguing for an implied statutory cause of action, need to make a strong showing that
their potential status as plaintiffs was foreseeable and intended.
But instead of being required to show congressional intent, these
plaintiffs must show that the contracting parties intended them to
benefit. With the difficulty of discerning intent from contractual
language well established, theirs will likely be a heavy burden.
90 See generally 4 A. ConN,

CoNTAcrs

§ 778 (1951).

91

Compare O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) with Weinberger
-v. NYSE, 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
92
Weinberger, 335 F. Supp. at 145. But see Weinberger v. NYSE, 403
F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that plaintiff had failed to establish right to
recovery on third-party beneficiary theory).

The O'Neill court held that the district court had not abused its discretion in
refusing to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a third-party beneficiary theory. The court held that such a claim did not arise under federal law.
339 F.2d at 770.
93

See notes 72-87 supra& accompanying text.

94 520 F.2d at 1382 n.19.
95 Because third-party beneficiary claims are asserted under state contract law, it
is necessary to analyze the conflict of laws rule regarding choice of law to govern the
parties' rights. The Restatement sets forth general principles governing choice of
law.

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND)

OF CONFaCT OF LAws §§ 6, 188 (1971).

For a

brief choice of law analysis in such a case, see Weinberger, 335 F. Supp. at 142-43.
It should be noted that the wide latitude granted to a court in making its choice of
law determination is not conducive to establishing uniform rules governing share-

holder rights under the listing agreement.
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III. LISTING AGREEMENTS' LEGALITY UNDER FEDERAL

SECURITIES LAWS
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided a number of
cases defining the limits of permissible federal securities regulation. Each of the several limitations that the Court has established
has a potential impact upon listing agreements' legality.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,96 the Court closely scrutinized
the relationship between a promulgated regulation and its authorizing legislation to insure that the regulation did not exceed
the statutory grant of power. In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green 97 and Burks v. Lasker,98 the Court addressed the problem
of the permissible intrusion of federal securities law upon the state's
traditional power to regulate corporations. Finally, in Gordon v.
NYSE, Inc.99 the Court dealt with the tension between the anticompetitive nature of the securities laws and the pro-competitive
aims of the antitrust laws.
A. Delegated Authority and Listing Agreements
The Supreme Court addressed the delegation problem 100 in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,01 interpreting the scope of rule lOb-5
and setting forth the proper standard for scrutinizing securities
rules. The Court rejected the argument for an expansive reading
of section 10 of the 1934 Act 102 urged by the plaintiff and the
SEC as amicus curiae, stating instead that:
Rule lOb-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted...
under § 10(b). The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a
96 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

97430 U.S. 462 (1977).
9s441 U.S. 471 (1979).
99 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
100 See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,

365 U.S. 1 (1961).
101425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the plaintiff suffered losses from a
securities scheme and attempted to recover damages from the accounting firm which
had audited the brokerage house. The suit was based on the theory that the
accountants, by negligently performing audits, had aided and abetted a violation of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The plaintiff did not allege or prove the accountants"
intent to defraud or knowledge of deception, and the Court held that, without proof
of specific knowledge or intent, the action could not be maintained.
102 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976): "It shall be unlawful for any person
. . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device ....
"
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Thus,

despite the broad view of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power
10 3
granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b).
In short, the Court held that deference to the administrative
body was not unlimited. Although agencies' interpretations of
their enabling statutes were to be given great weight, the Court
made clear that it would examine those interpretations, and regulations issued pursuant to them, to insure some relationship to congressional intent. The Court attached no express label to the proper
degree of scrutiny, but its analysis in Hochfelder seemed to test the
regulation's rationality in carrying out the enabling legislation's
purposes. 104
Although Hochfelder sets out the proper approach for judicial
examination of securities regulations, it is important to realize that
listing agreements present unique problems in applying the "rationality" test. For the Hochfelder Court was faced with a typical
securities case, involving the validity of an SEC rule promulgated
pursuant to an explicit congressional grant of authority.0 5 Because stock exchanges' rulemaking power is limited only by the very
broad purposes of the 1934 Act, 106 the inquiry is more complicated.
425 U.S. at 212-14.
Hochfelder thus explicitly affirmed the Court's "rationality" analysis in
prior securities rules cases. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 130 (1973) ("germane to fair dealing or investor protection"). Cf. Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
365 U.S. 1, 30 (1961) (Federal Power Commission did not act irrationally). For
a general discussion of the types of scrutiny the Court has applied in different areas
of the law, see G. GuNTHEr , CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsnTIoNAL. LAw 670-76
(10th ed. 1980).
The Court's probing inquiry in Hochfelder suggests that it may have applied a
rational test "with bite." See id. 691-93. Nevertheless, this Comment treats the test
as one of "mere" rationality, for the possible "bite" of examining "articulated rather
than hypothesized purposes," id. 692 n.4, seems insignificant when the "purpose" is
as broad as "protecting investors." See Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. at 135 ("we conclude, as the Government suggests, that the relationship between [the exchange rule]
and fair dealing and investor protection is 'extremely attenuated and peripheral, if it
exists at all.'" (quoting Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 9)).
105 425 U.S. at 212-14.
106 The exchanges' statutory authority includes:
103
104

(1) . . . the capacity to be able to carry out the purpose of this
chapter . . . and . . . to enforce compliance . . . with . . . the rules of
the exchange.
(5) The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles
of trade . . . and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest
1934 Act, § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976).
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Thus, instead of inquiring generally whether listing agreement provisions are legal rules that improperly exceed the stock exchanges'
,grant of authority, the question is specifically whether listing agreements properly advance the purposes that Congress intended ex.changes to serve when it passed the 1934 Act. Thus, the listing
.agreement restrictions must be rationally related to the purposes for
which Congress gave exchanges the power to regulate corporate
activities.
Congress granted self-regulatory organizations the power to
formulate rules which are, "designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade ... and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest .
107 Determining whether listing agreement
1...

restrictions are rationally related to these legislative purposes requires examination of the substance of the provisions.
Consideration of these provisions demonstrates that some are
clearly related to the exchanges' command to protect investors and
the public interest. For example, size, profitability, and shareholder
distribution requirements directly reduce the possibility of stock
price manipulations and "fly-by-night" corporations duping investors. 0 8 But other provisions, such as the independent audit
committee requirement and provisions relating to voting rights,
pose more difficult problems.
In defense of these broader provisions, exchanges can argue
that most preserve the rights of current equity holders by protecting
them from mismanagement or dilution of their ownership and
voting rights. 0 9 This argument for a broad reading of the power
to protect investors, however, may run afoul of the Court's narrow
view in Hochfelder. Even if the broad view prevailed, the legality
-of some provisions might still be a close question."10 But unless
1071934 Act, § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. §78f(b)(5) (1976).
08
See notes 39-40 supra & accompanying text. Yet even these basic provisions can be challenged, because, for example, the AMEX is willing to list securities of corporations that the NYSE finds too small, speculative, or closely held.
See note 39 supra. Do the investors on the one exchange require less protection
than those on the other? In all likelihood, however, a rational relation test would
permit each exchange to determine the meaning of "speculative" for itself.
109 See note 40 supra. In this regard the provisions may be analogized to the
-preemptive rights granted to shareholders at common law and modified by state
corporation statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE Ar. tit. 8, § 102(b) (3) (1975).
110 Under present case law, it would be very hard to justify voting rights provisions under the statutory language "prevention of fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices." The "manipulative" language is also found in section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, see note 102 supra, and the Supreme Court, labeling the phrase
"virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets," has restricted its scope to cover only situations involving nondisclosure. Hochfelder, 425

1448

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:1427

the degree of scrutiny is increased above the rationality standard,
the open-ended mandate to "protect investors" should insure listing agreements' legal survival.'-"
B. Federalismand Listing Agreements
Two recent cases reveal the Supreme Court's growing concern
about federal securities laws' effects on the traditionally state-regulated field of corporate conduct. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,"x2 much discussed for its impact on "freeze-outs," is more
significant to this Comment for its broader implications, which the
5
Court elaborated upon in Burks v. Lasker."
In Santa Fe, minority shareholders were "frozen out" of a public corporation that chose to "go private," and were forced to accept
cash for their shares."14 These shareholders then brought suit,
claiming that the transaction violated section 10(b) of the 1934
Act.' 1 5 The Supreme Court held that the district court properly
dismissed the complaint.
U.S. at 199. It would be anomalous, therefore, if the exchanges could make certain
conduct culpable by promulgating a rule under the precise language that, if proper
disclosures are made, bars a cause of action under present federal securities law.
The audit committee provision in NYSE listing agreements may be easier to
justify as helpful in ferreting out corporate misconduct and protecting investors'
interests than many of the older provisions governing voting rights. See SmATE
Comam. Ou BANEiNG, HousINa & URBAN ArrAms, 94TH CoNc., 2D SEss., REPOvr
OF Trr SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILEGAL CoRorATE PAYMETrs AND PRAcTICEs

67-69 (Comm. Print 1976).
113 "'[The
mere rationality test[,] ... when applied as articulated, leaves little
doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted, however, that in applying the mere rationality
test the Court had not adbdicated its responsibility to examine the legislation, but
had "acted only after a reasonably probing look at the legislative goals and means,
and at the significance of the personal rights and interests invaded." Id. 320.
112 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
113441 U.S. 471 (1979).
114By forcing minority shareholders to accept cash in lieu of stock, the majority
shareholder gains 100% control of the corporation. The potential unfairness to the
minority shareholders, particularly in light of the ineffectiveness of statutory appraisal
rights, has been much discussed. See, e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New
Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 H,uv. L. REv. 297 (1974); Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YAI. LJ. 1354 (1978).
115 In Santa Fe, the defendant increased its 60%share of Kirby Lumber Corp.
to 95%between 1968 and 1973. To acquire complete control of Kirby, Santa Fe
then created a wholly-owned subsidiary, to which it transferred cash and its Kirby
stock in return for the new subsidiary's stock. Santa Fe then caused the new
subsidiary to merge into Kirby with the 5% "minority" receiving cash based on an
independent banking firm's appraisal of the value of their shares. The merger took
place under the Delaware short form merger law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253
(1975). Full disclosure was made to the minority shareholder who, dissatisfied with
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First, the Court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege a
material misrepresentation or failure to disclose, a necessary element of the section 10(b) cause of action. 1 6 Second, the Court
bolstered its conclusion in dicta by examining the interplay between
state and federal law."17 Noting that private actions under section
10(b) were not created by explicit statutory language, the Court
analyzed the case under the familiar Cort test for implying private
rights of action under the federal securities laws."18 The dissenting
shareholders' argument collapsed under the question "whether 'the
cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law,'" 19
for the Court was satisfied that the state law "appraisal remedy" 120
12
,sufficiently occupied the field to preclude federal intervention.
In short, the Court was hesitant to intrude upon the state's
traditional sphere of corporate regulation, especially by expanding a
judicially created cause of action.
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden. .

.

"Corporations are

creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds
to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities
the cash offered, brought an action in federal court claiming that the unfairness of
the offer to them violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10o-5. Green v.
'Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dismissing complaint),
rev'd, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976) (2-1 decision), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
116 Based on the lower court's finding that there was no misrepresentation or
-omission, the Court refused to extend section 10(b) to cover substantive unfairness
,of a merger where all aspects of the transaction were fully disclosed. 430 U.S. at
474. By contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that state law requires
judicial examination of such mergers to ensure "complete fairness." Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
"17"The language of the statute is, we think, 'sufficiently clear in its context'
to be dispositive here, but even if it were not, there are additional considerations that
-weigh heavily against permitting a cause of action . ..for the breach . ..alleged
in this complaint." Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)). Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not join the portion
,of the Court's opinion analyzing those considerations. 430 U.S. at 480-81.
118 See note 74 supra and text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
119 430 U.S. at 478 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40
(1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975))).
1 20
See generally Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
-Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
2
1 1 "[A]s in Cort [422 U.S. at 84] and Piper [430 U.S. at 41], we conclude that
-'it is entirely appropriate in this instance to relegate respondent and others in his
wsituation to whatever remedy is created by state law."' 430 U.S. at 478.
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of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."

122

The federalism arguments supporting the Court's decision in
Santa Fe played a leading role in Burks v. Lasker.123 In Burks,
shareholders of an investment company derivatively sued the company's directors for allowing an investment that resulted in a huge
loss. The lower court, applying the "business judgment rule,"
granted summary judgment for the corporation. 2 4 The court of
appeals reversed, 12 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide "whether the disinterested directors of an investment company may terminate a stockholders' derivative suit brought . . .
under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts of
1940." 126
The Court, however, immediately shifted its analysis by stating
that "[t]o decide that question, we must determine the appropriate
roles of federal and state law in such a controversy." 127 The critical
122 Id.

479 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 84) (emphasis in Santa Fe).
123441 U.S. 471 (1979). This case was one of the many arising from the Penn
Central Railroad bankruptcy. The defendant mutual fund had invested heavily in
Penn Central commercial paper (unsecured short-term obligations) shortly before the
collapse, and experienced a $60 million loss when the corporation filed for reorganization. Shareholders of the company sued the directors derivatively under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976), for breach of
fiduciary duty in failing to analyze this investment independently, and for blindly
accepting the investment advisor's advice.
124 Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), re'd, 567 F.2d 1208
(2d Cir. 1978), reo'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). The district court reasoned that the
decision by the corporation's litigation committee, composed entirely of outside
directors, that the suit was not in the corporation's interest required dismissal.
The business judgment rule forbids courts from substituting their judgment for
that of directors. At the time of the district court's decision, New York law was
unsettled on the application of the rule when the judgment was made by a special
litigation committee. Since then, the New York Court of Appeals has approved
the rule's application to shareholder derivative suits. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). In a dramatic contrary
decision, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that, notwithstanding a decision not
to sue by an independent litigation committee, lower courts were to use their own
"business judgment" in determining whether to permit shareholder derivative suits.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (De. 1981). See general/y Arsht, The
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rzv. 93 (1980).
125 [T]he findings of Congress, the statutory scheme, and the relevant case
law persuade us that the statutorily disinterested directors of a registered
investment company were never meant to have the final word in determining whether it is in the best interest of a mutual fund to press
claims against their co-directors, and the adviser . . . , for breach of
fiduciary duties.
567 F.2d at 1210.
126441 U.S. at 473. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -50 (1976) (Investment Company Act); id. § 80b-1 to -20 (Investment Advisers Act).
127 441 U.S. at 473.
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issue before the Court, then, was not the business judgment rule's
applicability to an investment company, but the question whether
state law or federal securities policy governed shareholder derivative rights.
The Court assumed that the shareholders had an implied derivative cause of action under the Acts, 128 and thereby had stated a
federal claim. It therefore concluded that "'the overriding federal
law applicable here would, where the facts required, control the
appropriateness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation
law.'

"

129

In determining that the facts did not require federal law to
govern derivative suits, the Court examined the general application
of both state and federal law to corporate directors' powers, concluding that the former was "the font" and that the latter was
"largely regulatory and prohibitory." 130 So, because federal securities legislation was enacted against the background of state corporation law, the Court held that state law properly governed
unless it destroyed a federal right. In short, the "facts require"
federal securities law to override state corporation law only when
the state provision conflicts with an " 'identifiable federal policy
or interest.'

" 131

The analysis in Burks, although involving specific federal
statutes, seems likely to establish the framework for examining all
occasions of state and federal overlap in the securities field. 1 32 Thus,
listing agreements must be tested for consistency with state corporation law and, if a conflict exists, it must be determined whether
133
the agreements vindicate an identifiable federal policy.
128 But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
(private right under the Investment Advisers Act limited to voiding adviser's
contract). Note that the applicability of the Santa Fe-Burks line of reasoning to a
situation in which private rights of action are not implied is questionable.
129441 U.S. at 477 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964))
(emphasis in Burks).
130 Id. 478. "[Federal securities law] often limits the exercise of directorial
power, but only rarely creates it" Id.
131 Id. 479 (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
Because neither federal statute expressed congressional intent about
directors' rights to cut off derivative suits, the Court remanded for determination of
state law on the subject.
132 "[T]he threshold inquiry for a federal court . . . should have been to
determine whether state law permitted [the corporation's] disinterested directors to
terminate [the] suit. If so, the next inquiry should have been whether such a state
rule was consistent with the policy of the [federal statutes]:' Id. 480.
133 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion aptly summarized the Court's position:
I read th[e] opinion to hold that on remand the Court of Appeals . . .
should determine what the state law in this area requires, and then
whether that state law is consistent with the policy of the Investment
Company and Investment Advisers Acts. . . . [Ilt seems to me that a
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The substance of listing agreement provisions may play a determinative role in the question whether the agreements have
impermissibly passed the limits of federal securities law. The federalism inquiry should focus upon those provisions that have been
generally considered matters of state corporate law. Such provisions,
including mandatory voting requirements and limitations on structure and composition of the board of directors,1x have the greatest
chance of violating the pronouncements of Santa Fe and Burks.
The issue, then, is whether the listing agreement provisions
are consistent with the Securities Act's identifiable policies. If so,
then even in the event of a conflict with state law, Burks holds that
federal law will prevail. Only if state law conflicts with listing
agreement provisions and the provisions do not vindicate an identifiable federal policy or interest can the agreements be struck
5
down.13
The 1934 Act's purpose is to do whatever is required to protect investors.

But, "the principle .. .was that conflicting [state]

law ... should be pre-empted by exchange self-regulation 'only to
the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
Securities Exchange Act.' "16 The federalism claim, therefore, may
situation could very well exist where state law conflicts with federal policy.
The effectuation of that federal policy should not then be foreclosed ....
Id. 486-87.
34 See note 40 supra.
135 See Burks, 441 U.S. at 479-80.
136 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127
(1973) (quoting Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963)) (emphasis added).
The Court also stated that "any rule or practice not germane to fair dealing or
investor protection would not appear to fall under the shadow of the federal
umbrella; [the issue] is, instead, subject to applicable state law." Id. 130-31. Of
course, the rule may still withstand scrutiny, provided that it is consistent with the
state law. Id. 138.
Note that if the listing agreement provision fails to effectuate the Act's purposes, it will likely be invalid under the Hochfelder analysis. See notes 100-11
supra & accompanying text. But, assuming that ordinary scrutiny applies, it seems
clear that a "rational" argument can be made that these rules "protect investors."
And, an aim of protecting investors probably would justify major incursions into the
state law realm because it is premised on the nearly unlimited commerce power,
which provided Congress the ability to enact the 1934 Act. For a general discussion of Congress's vast commerce clause power, see G. GuiTHEr, supra note 104,
at 153-212.
Stock exchanges have enough impact on interstate commerce to be extensively
regulated. As the Court noted:
Stock exchanges perform an important function in the economic life of
this country. They serve, first of all, as an indispensable mechanism
through which corporate securities can be bought and sold. To corporate enterprise such a market mechanism is a fundamental element in
facilitating the successful marshaling of large aggregations of funds that
would otherwise be extremely difficult of access.
Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963).
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place more of a burden upon exchanges than the "mere rationality"
standard enunciated in Hochfelder, for the exchanges must apparently show that listing agreement preemption of state law is
necessary to vindicate the Act's policies. As the Court reiterated
in Merrill-Lynch,
[t]he principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be
deemed pre-emptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either 'that the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or
37
that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.
In summary, sweeping listing agreement provisions that conflict with state law could fall under a federalism attack. But this
result would occur only in the unlikely event that a court viewed
the provisions as unnecessary to carry out the broad Securities Act
policy of protecting investors.
C. Antitrust Law and Listing Agreements
Securities law, with its emphasis on self-regulation, is one of
the early New Deal programs which countermanded the goal of
competition in favor of a cooperative scheme of industrial selfgovernance. 138 Consequently, since the advent of securities regulation, the interaction between its provisions and those of the antitrust laws has been a matter of controversy, because:
[t]he difficult problem here arises from the need to reconcile pursuit of the anti-trust aim of eliminating restraints
in competition with the effective operation of a public
policy contemplating that securities exchanges will engage
in self-regulation which may well have anticompetitive
effects in general and in specific applications. 3 9
Most judicial and legislative activity dealing with this conflict
has focused on rules relating to broker-dealer members. Until recently, the most visible antagonism arose from the fixed minimum
commission pricing scheme imposed by the stock exchange. 40 Be'37

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963),

quoted in Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. at 139.
138M PnM.usH, SECUnrrMS REGULATION AND TE NEW DEAL (1970); E.
HAwLEY, THE NEw DEAL AND TH PR3OBLEM OF MONOPOLY 35-52 (1966).
See

also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (industry codes
of fair competition).
139 Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963).
14o These minimum commissions were a classic instance of "price ffidng" and
were the subject of intense debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The SEC
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cause the exchanges' rules are enforced by expulsion, violators are
forced to deal with obedient members at an economic disadvantage.141 This economic punishment of one broker-dealer by a
group of competitors, although permitted by the securities laws,
clearly raises antitrust issues.
The Supreme Court has twice attempted to define the coordination of these incongruous laws, both times in the context
142
of challenges to broker-dealer member rules. In Silver v. NYSE,
the Court refused to exempt a rule from antitrust attack. In
Gordon v. NYSE, 143 the Court found a different rule to be beyond
the reach of the antitrust laws. In Silver, the Court addressed a
claim that an exchange rule requiring members to disconnect phone
lines linking them to nonmembers was a conspiracy in restraint of
trade. The nonmember plaintiff persuaded the district court that
removal of the phones was a concerted refusal to deal and a per se
Sherman Act violation. 44 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the 1984 Act exempted the exchange from the Sherman Act
"because it is exercising a power which it is required to exercise by
the Securities Exchange Act." 145
The Supreme Court reversed. Acknowledging the philosophical conflict between the statutes, the Court sought to reconcile
them by examining the procedural checks on exchange self-regulation. Because there was "nothing built into the regulatory scheme
which performs the antitrust function of insuring that an exchange
will not ...

apply its rules so as to do injury to competition which

cannot be justified ...

,"

'146

the Court concluded that the antitrust

147
laws provided the only means for review of the rule.

finally forced the abolition of minimum fees in 1975. Mann, The New York Stock
Exchange: A Cartel at the End of Its Reign in
Othomon
COMmETrON iN REGUrATEI Mnx's 301 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
141Id. 302-03. See 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) f11653 (1981).
142 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
143 422 U.S. 659 (1975).

144Silver v. NYSE, 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). The case involved a NYSE rule
allowing the exchange summarily to cut off communications between the exchange
"floor" and a "wire member" whose business depended on these communications.
See 373 U.S. at 344-45.
.45 302 F.2d at 721.
Although the SEC oversees the highly regulated securities industry, the Commission had no way of reviewing the rule's application to
the plaintiff. See 373 U.S. at 357-58.
146 373 U.S. at 358.

147"Should review of exchange self-regulation be provided through a vehicle
other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to antitrust exemption would be
presented."

Id. 360. The Court struck down the rule because the refusal to con-

tinue private wires "occurred under totally unjustifiable circumstances."

Id. 361.
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In Gordon v. NYSE, 48 the Court considered the aforementioned rule fixing minimum commission rates. 49 The Court followed Silver faithfully, holding that the SEC's "explicit statutory
authorization... [to] review ... all exchange rules and practices
dealing with rates of commission ..." 150 performed the "antitrust
function" that the Silver Court had demanded.
The Court's analysis in these cases focused upon the "implied
repeal" of antitrust laws. 51 If an exchange rule violated the antitrust laws, it had to be both "'necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work and even then [must repeal the Sherman Act]
only to the minimum extent necessary.' "152 Because of the similarity between broker-dealer rules and listing agreements, this
3
analysis should also apply to the latter.1
There -can be no application of the Gordon-Silver test, however, unless listing agreements violate the antitrust laws. Here
the distinction between broker-dealer and listing agreement rules
is important, for their different effects suggest different antitrust
consequences.
Restrictive practices by broker-dealer associations can operate
both to damage competitors and to reduce the quantity of securities
firm services available to the public.'8 4 For example, the denial
of a membership to a broker-dealer injures both the broker-dealer,
who cannot trade, and the public, who have a limited number of
broker-dealers to patronize. This is a horizontal 8 5 division of
markets, and, absent immunity, might violate the antitrust laws.18 a
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented because he felt that antitrust laws should not be used "to enforce the Court's concept of fair procedures
under a totally unrelated statute." Id. 370.
148 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
149The SEC had abolished fixed rates effective seven weeks before Gordon was
decided. See id. 662, 681-82.
150 Id.685.
151 Implied repeal stands for the proposition that certain actions will be immune
from the antitrust laws because they are justified by other laws. See id. 682-89.
152 422 U.S. at 685 (quoting Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
153 One court followed this precise reasoning in considering the antitrust implications of listing agreements. Harding v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 527 F.2d
1366 (5th Cir. 1976).
164 See, e.g., Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes
Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1970).
10 The distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints of trade, although
not always easy to define, is nonetheless central to enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Horizontal restrictions operate at a single level in the distribution of goods and
services among a group of competitors. See 16 J. voN KAIw owsm Busmzss
ORrANiZATiONS: ANTITruST LAws AND TPE REGULATIoN §6.02[2] for a discussion
of the variety of restraints of trade which have been tested under U.S. antitrust laws.
156 In general, such agreements are illegal per se. United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); J. VoN KAuLNOwSm, supra note 155,
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Listing agreement restrictions do not effect similar restraints.
Corporations are not broker-dealers' competitors, so the restraint
operates, if at all, vertically rather than horizontally. 157 Furthermore, denial of listed status does not reduce the quantity of corporate securities available to the public because other markets for
trading the securities are available. Under these circumstances,
the vertical restraints imposed by the stock exchanges would at
most be subjected to antitrust scrutiny under the "rule of reason." "I"
Even if a court did find that a listing agreement provision
violated the antitrust laws, a finding of antitrust immunity is almost
compelled by the Silver-Gordon analysis. Examination of the
listing agreement provisions by the SEC,' 5 9 and the significant role
that listing plays in the Securities Act disclosure process, 60 justify
application of the "implied repeal" theory to listing agreements.
In a recent decision, Shumate & Co. v. NYSE,' 6' a district court
interpreted Gordon to mean that it was not required to conclude
that a particular stock exchange rule was essential to carry out the
purpose of the 1934 Act. 162 Rather, the court made its inquiry
whether "the implied repeal of the antitrust laws with respect to
these . .. restrictions is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
Act. . . ."16 Using this theory, the court upheld NYSE Rule
390,16 a brazen form of market division forbidding members to
trade NYSE listed securities on other exchanges or in the over-thecounter market. The rule has been severely criticized on anti§ 6.02[2][d]. But see United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 730-35 (1975) (holding alleged horizontal conspiracy to prevent
growth of secondary market in mutual fund shares immune from antitrust attack
because of SEC regulatory authority).
57
1 1n contrast to horizontal agreements among competitors, vertical agreements
occur between enterprises at different levels in the chain of distribution and production. J. VoN KALINowsKT, supra note 155, § 6.02[1] provides examples of such
restraints. The less severe effects of vertical restraints have led the courts to hold
them permissible if reasonable and ancillary to a legitimate purpose. See, e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
158 See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 36.
159 See note 45 supra.
160 See note 26 supra.
161 486 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
62

The court quoted the Supreme Court's statement in Gordon that the " 'factual
question as to whether fixed commission rates are actually necessary to the operation
of the exchanges . . . [is different] from the 'legal question as to whether allowance
of an antitrust suit would conflict with the operation of the regulatory scheme which
specifically authorizes the SEC to oversee the fixing of commission rates."' Id. 1339
(quoting Gordon, 422 U.S. at 688) (emphasis added).
163 486 F. Supp. at 1343 (emphasis added).
164 Rule 390 forbids stock exchange members from trading in listed securities off
the floor of the exchange. 2 NYSE GumE (CCH) f[2390 (1978).
'
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trust grounds and seems only minimally connected to effecting the
purposes of the 1934 Act.165 It seems likely, therefore, that application of Shumate's reasoning would uphold the less restrictive
listing agreement provisions. 66
IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL

A. Conclusion
Two commentators have recently suggested that the rules
governing the conduct of large, publicly held corporations and
their managers should be standardized, with officers, directors, and
parent corporations owing their shareholders particular duties of
loyalty. 67 This Comment suggests that the correct source of these
rules is not state corporation law, but the financial markets in which
these firms' securities are traded. The advantages of this source of
"regulation" are a much lower cost of information to investors and
a properly adapted enforcement mechanism.'01
The cost of information would be reduced by shrinking the
number of regulatory regimes from fifty to two or three. Thus,
stock exchanges would become an invaluable instrument for protecting investors from unsound investment choices by increasing
the amount of information available to potential investors about
the economic and legal rights that attach to an equity investment.
As this lower cost of information encouraged more informed
decisionmaking, investors would suffer fewer losses, and enforcement would rely less on the lengthy and costly judicial process
invoked by investors' private actions. Instead, enforcement would
proceed primarily through the delisting process.
Financial market "regulation," despite its advantages, presents
potential legal problems. The most serious, stemming from the
Hochfelder doctrine, is the possible finding that stock exchange
regulation exceeds delegated authority or improperly intrudes
165 See Note, NYSE Rules and the Antitrust Laws-Rule 394-Necessary Restriction or Illegal Refusal to Deal, 45 ST. JotN's L. REv. 812 (1971).
166 The listing agreement provisions most antagonistic to antitrust laws are the
minimum size and distribution requirements, which effectively divide markets between, for example, the NYSE and the AMEX. See note 39 supra & accompanying
text. It is hard to imagine that these provisions could be vulnerable on antitrust
grounds, because they date back to the inception of the Sherman Act itself.
Ch. 647, §§ 1-6 & 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890). The economic impact of other provisions is far slighter, so it is difficult to see how they alone could fall.
'67 Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HAzv. L.
REv. 998, 1022-54 (1981).
1Os See id. 1028-37 (costs and benefits of rules applied to full-time officers and
executives).
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upon state corporate law. Such a finding is a real possibility where
the exchange threatens to delist corporate securities to enforce the
listing agreement, for delisting is a sanction approaching exercise
of governmental authority by the exchange. A solution to this
problem which maintains the informational and operational advantages of using the stock exchanges as a source of corporate
"'regulation" is outlined in the following proposal.
B. Proposal
It is proposed that the stock exchanges split their listed corporations into several classes. 169 The first class would be corporations choosing to abide by stringent provisions of strengthened
listing agreements. These requirements might include independent
directors committees, such as audit, nomination, or compensation; 170
procedures for handling stockholder litigation; 171 submission to
shareholders of offers to purchase the corporation's shares; 172 minimum price requirements for final stage "freeze-out mergers" 173
and other provisions protecting shareholders' rights. The lower
classes would consist of corporations choosing to abide by successively less restrictive listing requirements, mostly relating to size
and profitability.
With a multi-class system, investors could be informed of the
requirements each corporation has agreed to follow and could take
these requirements into account in making their investment decisions. Corporations which breached their class requirements would
be "relisted," but placement in a lower class would be a less severe
16 9

Two or three classes are probably preferable.

This suggestion is admittedly

somewhat arbitrary, for more classes would result in more flexibility.

But this

flexibility would be accompanied by a loss in the informational advantages of making

fewer evaluations.
170ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the
Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAw 1335, 1351-60 (1980) (discusses the roles of
various committees).
171 For example, putting some limitations on the ability of independent directors
to have a derivative suit dismissed in the best interests of the company. See, e.g.,
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981).
172 But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW.

101, 113-20 (1979) (rejecting automatic submission to shareholder vote of takeover
bid on practical and policy grounds).
17

3The model corporation code recognizes the need to protect minority shareholders in freeze-outs, and requires that the corporation include financial statements
and notice of the shareholder's right to demand additional payment with remittances
of fair value of the shares. MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 81(f)(3). Cf. Coleman v.
Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 631-36 (3d Cir. 1981) (protection for minority shareholders in

freeze-outs guaranteed by Delaware law).
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punishment than delisting under the current regime.1 7 4 Thus, it
is less likely that a court would find "coercion," a critical element
in exercising delegated governmental power, and the Hochfelder
problem would be avoided. Yet it would not be necessary to sacrifice the informational advantage of using the listing agreement
to control corporate conduct.
The fixed income security market, where rating agencies such
as Standard & Poor's and Moody's classify bonds based on the
obligor's credit characteristics and the terms of the obligation, 17
provides a parallel to this proposed system. Obligors who fail to
meet the requirements of a particular status have their rating
lowered. Even though the rating agencies use up to ten categories,
these ratings greatly reduce the information cost of assessing the
value of the multitude of fixed income securities available in the
investment marketplace
Of course, the rights of an equity securityholder are far more
complex than a fixed income securityholder's rights. Equity securities, therefore, are less easily defined in contractual terms than
fixed income securities. But, by increasing the extent to which
equity securities can be cast in a contractual mold, the proposal
alleviates some of the difficulty faced by courts and commentators in
developing rules of corporate fiduciary behavior from the vague
prescriptions of corporate law and precedent. To serve the public,
such rules should flow from the needs of corporate issuers and investors, not from the judicial imagination.
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Some of the serious consequences that may flow from delisting are detailed

in note 48 supra.
175 See, e.g., MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., MOODx'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL

(1980). For example, an increase in a corporation's debt to equity ratio can result
in lower bond ratings because of the perceived increase in financial risk. See, e.g.,
Moody's Lowers Du Pont's Rating, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1981, at D4, cols. 5-6.

